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Abstract 
Shifting from a government-controlled system ofmotor insurance regulation to a market­
based system has caused unexpected outcomes in Italy. Although there is more 
competition since deregulation occurred twelve years ago, the government has had mixed 
results attempting to continue to control the market. This paper will examine how pricing 
deregulation on the European Union level has caused significant changes in the Italian 
market. Furthermore, it will seek to develop a national solution for regulation of auto 
insurance pricing within the United States using Italian experience. Regulation in the 
insurance industry in the United States has been a subject of debate for quite some time, 
and although there has been consensus among researchers on the need to change current 
regulations, agreement on changes to make has not been quite as simple. The 
recommendation of this study is to implement a system of federal supervision in pricing 
regulation, while allowing states to conduct day-to-day oversight. 
The Pricing Effects of European Union Insurance
 
Liberalization on Italian Motor Insurance
 
Introduction
 
Regulation ofthe insurance industry has historically been a highly regulated area in the 
United States. When the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in 1945, the regulation of 
insurance, including auto, was determined to be in the public interest of the states 
(Cummins,2002). Consequently, a variety of rate regulations has developed in different 
states. Although there has been consensus among researchers on the need to change 
current insurance regulation, agreement on changes to make has not been quite as simple. 
There have been several proposals, which have not passed, in the past few years about 
how to modernize the industry as a whole to achieve more efficient, market-based 
regulation of insurance. For example, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC), has been working towards convincing state insurance 
commissioners to adopt "a common set of standards for a uniform market regulatory 
oversight program that will include all states" (NAIC, 2003). Another proposal is by the 
National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) promoting a use and file system l . 
While, such systems do promote change, they do not address the entire regulatory 
problem. 
The US auto insurance industry in its current state is a problem for both the inslrrance 
companies participating in the market and consumers who are legally obligated to 
purchase an auto insurance policy. Because insurers face dramatically varying 
regulations by state, costs are increased. A recent regulatory efficiency study about US 
insurance by Grace and Klein (1999) concludes that operating efficiencies can be gained 
by "eliminating non-essential market regulations and standardizing those regulations that 
are retained." Accordingly, by allowing insurers to use one rate structure instead of 
developing rates for all states, the creation a more efficient regulatory system is possible. 
A similar situation occurred just over a decade ago in the European Union (EU). 
However, while Cooper and Dorfman (2004) have written a plan for regulatory reform in 
the US using details from the EU, research trying to apply results from EU insurance 
liberalization to the US, is limited. Similar to Cooper and Dorfman (2004), this paper 
will seek to use regulations of the EU to provide suggestions for reform in the us. 
However, the focus will be on outlining a system ofpricing regulation for the us that 
provides consumer protection by promoting competition and increasing access to 
insurance products2 • Moreover, specifically this paper will look at the effect the EU third 
non-life directive had on Italian regulations for motor insurance pricing. 
The organization of this paper is in the following manner: The second section will give a 
history of Italian Motor Insurance. The third will illustrate the changes that have occurred 
1 A system of regulation where an insurer can use rates for a period of time before being required to file 
them with the state. 
2 Increasing access to insurance products refers to creating a wider range ofprices for motor insurance 
products. Such a goal would be accomplished by going from a fixed price system to one in which 
companies set their own separate rates. 
in Italy because ofthe implementation of the EU third non-life directive. The fourth will 
use experiences learned from Italy to apply to the US. Finally, section five proves 
concluding comments. 
Italian Motor Insurance History 
Motor insurance3 has been and continues to be a large part of the insurance market in 
Italy. As of2005, the Italian National Association of Insurance Companies (ANIA) 
reported that motor insurance accounted for approximately 51% ofnon-life4 premiums 
collected. Motor insurance has been compulsory in Italy since December of 1969. Since 
that time, there have also been strict regulations on tariffs, or premiums, that insurers 
charge. Until 1994, the rates were set by the Italian Inter-ministerial Prices Committee 
(CIP) based on recommendations from a commission ofexperts (Filippi Committee). To 
determine these rates, the Filippi Committee met annually to set a range of possible rates 
a company could charge for the next year. This range ofrates used a set pure premium 
and a range ofpossible loadings. In addition, three variables helped to personalize an 
individual's rate: accident history, province of residence, and car power (Luperto and 
Porrini, 2005) s. Accordingly, there was a small, if any, pricing differentiation among 
inslrrers. 
A number of issues have historically plagued the Italian motor insurance market. In its 
review of the Italian insurance industry in 2005, ANIA reports that prior to 1994, Italian 
motor insurance premiums did not respond to market conditions, as measured by the rate 
of inflation. A comparison of rate increases against inflation is shown in Table 1. 
Additionally, industry-wide combined ratios6 are examined to determine the adequacy of 
rates. Starting in 1984, the growth of rates started to exceed the rate of inflation. 
Although rates were increasing, the industry-wide combined ratio was increasing to over 
110 percent. As indicated by an increasing combined ratio, this meant that rates were 
becoming inadequate. By the end of the 1980's, a number of companies went bankrupt. 
The bankruptcies caused the rates to rise faster than inflation in the early 1990's, but 
adequacy was still not achieved (ANIA, 2005). 
3 In Europe, vehicles are insured with motor insurance rather than with auto insurance, as in the us. 
4 Non-life insurance refers to property/casualty insurance in the US and includes both auto and homeowners 
insurance 
S The inclusion of accident history was by using a Bonus-Malus system. This system rewards and penalizes 
drivers in the form of increased or reduced premiums based upon past accidents. Prior to 1991, the Bonus­
Malus system in place had thirteen possible levels with a maximum of a 30% bonus and a maximum of a 
100% malus. In 1991, a new system with eighteen classes was introduced. The maximum discount was 
50%, while the maximum surcharge was 100% (Lemaire and Hongmin, 1994). The new system was not the 
result of deregulation; rather it occurred near the same time. Thus, the specific details need not be 
addressed in this paper. However, what is of importance is that the bonus or malus is included in the 
premium following other calculations and is the same for all insurers. For additional reading on Bonus­
Malus systems, see Lemaire (1995). Car power refers to the power of an engine, or horsepower. 
6 The combined ratio is the sum of the loss ratio and the expense ratio. A ratio of less than 100 percent 
means that a company earned a profit on insurance operations. 
As noted, prior to rate deregulation in 1994, premiums were increasing. To determine 
these increasing costs, frequency and severity are multiplied together. Table 2 shows the 
history of frequency and severity of claims in Italian motor insurance. Before 1994, two 
trends are of importance in the table. First, the frequency of claims was falling below 
historical levels. However, it was still above levels in marketplaces throughout the EU. 
Additionally, claims were costing more. Because frequency and severity are multiplied 
together to determine the basis for the premium, an overall increase in rates resulted. 
However, because ofheavily regulated rates, premium increases did not follow higher 
costs proportionately. Accordingly, the Italian market was struggling at the time of 
implementation of the third ED non-life insurance directive. 
The Third European Union Non-Life Insurance Directive 
The third non-life directive introduced the ED to a single insurance market in 1994. In 
planning the supranational reforms, the goals of the directive were to create a single 
insurance marketplace in the ED, promote competition, and increase the supply of 
insurance products.7 Because ofbecoming a single marketplace, companies were able to 
operate in all member countries after receiving a license in only one. In addition, rating 
regulation changed how rates were determined in ED member countries. Throughotlt the 
entire ED, great changes were being made to allow for a unified marketplace. These 
changes were quite evident in Italy, as the Italian motor insurance industry changed 
dramatically in and after 1994. After deregulation, companies in Italy were responsible 
for setting their own rates. In effect, what the liberalization has done to Italy is free it to 
react to market forces, causing rates to reflect loss experience. Although many changes 
resulted from the directive, the focus here will be on the effect of pricing regulation on 
competition and supply. 
Prior to the directive, ED members could set pricing regulations by country, as there was 
no supranational control. As shown in Italy, this could result in the government 
controlling rates. However, after the directive, the type of allowable regulation was much 
more limited. COllntries could no longer use prior approval rating. According to Council 
Directive 92/49/EEC (1992), as "Member States shall not, however, adopt provisions 
requiring the prior approval or systematic notification of...scales ofpremiums...which an 
undertaking intends to use with policyholders." In addition, the directive states that, 
"Member States may not retain or introduce prior notification or approval ofproposed 
increases in premium rates except as part ofgeneral price-control systems." 
7 There have been a total of five directives non-life directives by the ED. Although the third directive is the 
directive dealing with pricing regulation, the others are important in creating a single ED marketplace. The 
fIrst directive was adopted in 1973 and gave insurers the right to establish subsidiaries, branch offices, and 
agencies in each member country. However, insurers were required to be licensed in each country. The 
second directive, adopted in 1990 allowed insurers to do business in other member countries without having 
started a branch in each country (Cummins and RUbio-Misas, 2001). The fourth directive was introduced in 
2003. It introduced procedures for out of country accidents and created a national registration system for 
vehicles and the amount of liability coverage on vehicles (ANIA, 2004). The fifth directive increases 
minimum liability amounts, refined a procedure for out of country claims, and ensures that countries cannot 
limit compensation caused by uninsured vehicles (ANIA, 2005). 
While the directive does not entirely prohibit a price control system, it does make such a 
system difficult to implement or become legal. Court opinions from case C-59/01 (2003) 
have determined that a general price control system must be an economy wide price 
control system. Thus, the controls must not solely affect one sector, such as third-party 
liability motor insurance. Accordingly, it is not permissible to use a prior approval 
system that does not also control prices throughout an economy. The result of this 
regulation had a great effect on Italian motor insurance, as it allowed companies to 
determine their own rates. 
Furthermore, it increased flexibility in rating by allowing for additional variables. Before 
the directive, only three variables were available for use in rating, as they were set by the 
CIP. The resulting freedoms caused the use ofnlany new variables, allowing for more 
flexibility and hence competition. An example of the variables used, as of 1996, is 
shown in Table 3. When considering the variables in the table, it is important to note 
companies mayor may not use all listed variables, thus it should be considered a guide 
and not a rule. Additionally, the comparison to the US illustrates a regulatory philosophy 
as to which variables are allowable by regulators in the EU and us. However, such a 
topic is beyond the scope of this papers. 
Moreover, the directive effectively increased the supply ofmotor insurance products to 
the Italian marketplace. Although, the number ofcompanies present in the insurance 
marketplace traditionally measures supply, such a measure cannot be considered adequate 
in this situation given the uniform nature ofprevious tariffs. Accordingly, there would 
have been no benefit for a consumer to attempt to switch insurers to receive a different 
rate. However, now that the supply has increased as insurers now set their own rates, 
consumers are often able to find a less expensive price for the same insurance. ANIA 
(2005) reports that on average, when seeking the lowest price, a consumer can find a 
reduction of about ten percent. Consequently, the directive has increased the supply of 
motor insurance products in Italy. 
However, the insurance market in Italy was not entirely positive after the implementation 
of the third directive. The beliefwas that the directive would result in a greater stability 
of premiums. However, the market was not in a good condition before the directive, thus 
leading to unexpected results. Instead ofcausing tariffs to beconle more stable, they have 
risen dramatically, as shown in Table 1. In fact, the average premitun increase from 1980 
to 1994 was just over four euros a year. In the period from 1994 to 2004 that increase has 
been about eleven euros per year. However, ANIA (2005) illustrates that these rate 
increases are not the direct result of the third directive. The increases are primarily from 
property damage and an increase in the cost of the cost ofvehicle repairs. In fact, from 
1996 to 2004, there has been an average increase in the cost ofproperty damage per claim 
of 70%. This compares to a 20% overall increase in prices. Similarly, Turchetti and 
Daraio (2004) report that the increasing premiums are the result of combination of several 
factors: an increase in the number ofvehicles, higher powered cars, higher insured value, 
increase in the average cost of compensations for damage, the rise in the cost ofrepairs, 
frequency ofcervical spine lesions, and the frequency of fraud. 
S For additional reading about the regulation ofpricing variables, see Luperto and Porrini (2005) or 
Buzzacchi and Valletti (2002). 
Because the determination of pure premium is not solely by the average cost of claims, it 
is also necessary to consider claim frequency, which has declined. Similarly, this should 
not be attributed to the implementation of the third directive. Rather, ANIA (2004, 2005) 
reports that vehicles are safer, cars are driven less, more fraud checks are occurring, less 
minor damage is being reported, and a driving record reflecting traffic violations. 
To create an improved marketplace, the Italian government attempted two courses of 
action, both occurring in 2000: antitrust regulation and a price freeze. As reported by 
ANIA (2001), the Italian motor insurance market had antitrust violations by 39 ofthe 81 
companies in the motor insurance market. It was found that these 39 companies were 
exchanging data and therefore creating similar rates. This cooperation by companies was 
found to have contributed to the significant price increases9• Accordingly, prices were not 
free to competition, causing a smaller supply ofproducts. 
Antitrust regulation was not the only way that the government attempted to retain control 
over escalating premiums. In response to increasing prices, the government took action 
to freeze tariffs in 2000, stating, "that insurance companies shall not apply any rate 
increase to policyholders that have not been the cause ofclaims during the last period of 
observation as regards third party motor liability policies renewed within one year from 
29 March 2000..." (ANIA, 2000) This effectively prevented any further price increases. 
However, because the action violated the third directive, ANIA took the issue to the 
European Court ofJustice. 
The Court of Justice concluded that the price freeze was in violation ofEuropean 
regulations. Specifically, that the regulations were designed so that rates were to be 
freely established (ANIA, 2003). Consequently, the principles of the third directive 
caused the tariff freeze to be overturned. Accordingly, the third directive did in fact 
promote competition, and did not allow the government to restrict the competition. 
US Regulatory Consequences 
Consequently, using the stated goals ofproviding consumer protection by promoting 
competition and increasing access insurance products, a model using regulations from the 
EU and Italy will be developed. To develop this model, it is first necessary to understand 
the condition ofauto insurance rate regulation in the US. There is a great variability in 
regulations in the US because each state, instead of federal government, has been 
regulating the commerce of insurance. In Illinois, insurance companies are free to set 
their own rates, known as competitive rating, although they may be required to provide 
supporting documents to justify their rates. This is the most liberal form of all rating laws 
in the U.S. On the other extreme is the prior approval system ofNew Jersey until 2005. 
The strict regulatory system caused a number of insurers to refrain from conducting 
business in the state. 
9 For additional information regarding the price increases and possible solutions for the price increases, see 
Buzzacchi (2001). This paper is in Italian. 
These extremes show that regulation is by no means similar. It is for this reason, that a 
system of rate regulation making all states required to use the exact same regulations 
would not be a possible solution, at least politically. Adopting a system similar to the one 
that the European Union imposed does not mean that all states must act in the same 
manner. Instead, it means a national system customized by each state. An example ofthe 
use ofvariables to customize rates by country in the EU is included as part ofTable 3. 
Although Italy, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom are all part of 
the EU, national regulations cause different variables to be used depending on the 
country. 
Although the Italian market did not produce results as expected, it has provided a number 
of important lessons that should be applied to the US. First and most important is that the 
indications ofthe market should not be ignored. As was the case in Italy, regulators 
imposed rates that caused the combined ratio to increase. The result was first 
insolvencies, and second, the use of large rates increases which were needed to adjust the 
tariffs to adequate levels. Although, it took the market eight years to reach the point 
where the combined ratio was less than 100%, rate increases in the past two years have 
been under 5% (ANIA, 2005). Accordingly, the implementation of this lesson for pricing 
is through allowing companies to set rates as they see fit. Further analysis of this topic 
would require examining solvency regulation lO, but it is beyond the scope of this paper 
and should be the subject of future study. 
As demonstrated by the ruling in case C-59/01, regarding Council Directive 92/49/EEC, 
the goal is to provide ''the widest possible range of insurance products in the Community 
so that he can choose that which is best suited to his needs" (2003). Applied to the US, a 
similar conclusion should be drawn. More precisely, a national regulatory system that 
ensures pricing regulation allowing insurers to set their own rates is most suitable. This 
system, as in the EU, should act in a way that encourages responses to the market, rather 
than a system designed to control pricing systems. However, such a system that 
absolutely prohibits prior pricing controls would be difficult to pass politically. 
Therefore, the provision of "general price control systems" should be added. By 
requiring this provision, the auto insurance industry would not be singled out by 
regulators. Instead, many industries would have to be included within the controls. 
Creating a system that encourages states to open the auto insurance marketplace to the 
free market will cause two events to happen: greater competition to exist among states 
and a greater quantity of products to be offered. These two points are illustrated from the 
recent example ofmarket deregulation in South Carolina. Prior to deregulation in South 
Carolina, regulations limited insurers in their use of accident history, territories, and 
mandated a 20% safe driver discount. In addition, there were strict enforcements of price 
10 The role of solvency regulation is to make sure insurers have enough money to pay claims, thus 
preventing insolvency. Current regulations require solvency regulation to be overseen by the member 
country in which the head office is located. There is an overall guideline, and each country can set control 
solvency how it sees fit. Accordingly, each country can determine categories for investments, valuation of 
assets, and calculation of technical reserves (The Council ofEuropean Communities, 1973). For additional 
reading about ED insurance solvency, see CEA (2006). 
ceilings. These combinations led to a large residual marketll where customers in the 
normal insurance market were heavily subsidizing the residual market. Initial reports by 
Cummins (2002) tell ofthe positive results ofderegulation. First, a substantial reduction 
of the residual market, from 42% in 1992 to 28% and falling in 1998, has occurred. 
Additionally, an increase in the number ofcompanies participating in the market 
occurred. In 1999, the year ofderegulation the number ofcompanies participating in the 
South Carolina market increased from 61 to 104. Therefore, deregulation ofpricing 
regulations has been shown to provide both increased competition and an increase in 
products offered in Italy as well as South Carolina. 
Conclusion 
The implementation of the third EU non-life directive has greatly changed the Italian 
motor insurance market. By creating more competition and a greater supply of products, 
the directive has helped to deregulate the marketplace. The deregulation, however, did 
not transfer all control from the Italian government, as antitrust solutions were 
successfully applied in 2000. 
This model of motor insurance between the EU and Italy, should act as a guide for a US 
state and federal auto insurance system. Because research supports a uniform insurance 
regulatory structure, a federal governing body should be established. The federal body 
would set national regulations that must be used by states. Each state would then have 
the power to control operations within it, such as acceptable variables or antitrust 
violations. Accordingly, a federal oversight group should be created in order to oversee 
the regulation of the pricing of auto insurance in the United States. 
11 A residual market occurs when insures do not voluntarily insure consumers and are instead required to 
insure these individuals, who are considered higher risks. 
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Table 1
 
Rate Increases in Italy (1984-2004)
 
Year Premium (Base 1984) Inflation (Base 1984) 
1984 100.0 100.0 
1985 106.9 108.3 
1986 115.7 114.6 
1987 121.4 119.7 
1988 124.6 125.4 
1989 134.2 133.3 
1990 147.4 141.3 
1991 165.2 150.8 
1992 179.9 159.8 
1993 184.2 166.8 
1994 189.6 173.6 
1995 199.8 183.4 
1996 210.1 191.1 
1997 226.8 195.7 
1998 239.6 200.7 
1999 264.2 207.7 
2000 276.5 215.8 
2001 286.7 224.0 
2002 302.9 233.7 
2003 312.3 242.1 
2004 313.7 247.1 
Source: Associazione Nazionale fra Ie Imprese Assicuratrici (2005) 
Table 2 
Claims Frequency and Average Claims Cost in Italian Motor Insurance 1980-2004 
Year Claims Frequency Average Claims Cost12 
1980 15.21% 1227 
1981 14.33% 1272 
1982 13.84% 1244 
1983 13.40% 1359 
1984 13.42% 1395 
1985 13.46% 1432 
1986 13.61% 1487 
1987 14.04% 1519 
1988 14.00% 1545 
1989 14.69% 1505 
1990 14.61% 1541 
1991 14.02% 1634 
1992 13.42% 1748 
1993 11.83% 1947 
1994 11.19% 2025 
1995 11.71% 2153 
1996 11.63% 2256 
1997 11.54% 2395 
1998 10.95% 2635 
1999 11.05% 2815 
2000 10.95% 3105 
2001 9.55% 3427 
2002 8.78% 3707 
2003 8.63% 3889 
2004 8.45% 3965 
Source: Based on Associazione Nazionale fra Ie Imprese Assicuratrici (2005) and US 
Department ofLabor (2005) data 
12 Real cost in 2004 euros 
Table 3
 
Rating Variables in EU Member Countries and selected US states (1996 data)
 
Italy CA 
N 
J PA TX 
Belgium Canada France Germany Spain UK 
Experience 
Rating X X 
X X X X X X 
Gender X X p. X X X X X X 
Age X X X X X X X X X X 
Place of 
Residence X 
X X X X X X 
Occupation X X X X X 
Marital Status X X X X X X 
Years of 
Driving 
License X X 
X X X X 
Coverage of 
Specified 
Driver 
X X X X 
Parking X X 
Car Type X X X X X X X X X X 
Car Age X X 
Mileage for 
year X X X X 
X X X X 
Car Utilization X X X X X X X X 
Car Power X X X X X X 
Safety Device X X 
Ownership of 
more than 
one car 
X X X 
* Prohibited
 
Source: Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (2003)
 
